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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic presents an exceptional crisis situation not only
for governments, but also for politicians in opposition. This article analyses
opposition party expressed sentiment vis-a-vis government actions and poli-
cies during the first six months of 2020. Based on an original content analysis
of parliamentary debates in four established parliamentary democracies
(Germany, Israel, Netherlands, United Kingdom), relatively positive opposition
expressed sentiment in parliament early on during the crisis is observed, in
line with a ‘rally effect’ observed in public opinion. Sentiment turned more
negative as the first wave of the crisis abated. Larger opposition parties with
considerable prior government experience were more positive than larger
parties without such experience.
KEYWORDS Opposition; government; parliament; COVID-19; legislative behaviour
The COVID-19 pandemic presents a crisis situation that requires exten-
sive government action, whereas the role of parliamentary opposition par-
ties is less clear. Government-opposition relations during a crisis can
range from consensus seeking to strictly adversarial. The COVID-19 pan-
demic presents a special type of crisis: primarily a public health crisis, but
with important social and economic consequences. It directly affects the
daily life of many citizens as well as work in parliament, impacting the
way in which governments can be held to account.
From a normative democratic perspective, government-opposition rela-
tions in times of crisis may entail contrasting implications. On the one
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hand, government-opposition consensus on crisis measures increases their
legitimacy among the public. On the other hand, the opposition’s criticism
is important as a catalyst for public discourse, which is vital for democracy
especially in times of crisis when governments are prone to seek more
powers and to weaken checks. It is therefore important to understand how
opposition parties behaved during the first months of the COVID-19 crisis.
We analyse opposition parties’ parliamentary behaviour, more specific-
ally their expressed sentiment vis-a-vis the government in parliamentary
speeches, during the first six months of 2020 and explore explanations for
variation in this sentiment over time and between opposition parties.
Building on the ‘rally around the flag’ literature, our main expectation is
that as the pandemic develops, and the nature of the crisis changes from
mostly an acute public health crisis to a mix of public health, social and
economic crisis, opposition parties’ expressed sentiment towards the gov-
ernment in parliamentary debates on COVID-19 shifts. We expect
expressed sentiment to follow a curvilinear pattern over time, starting out
at regular, moderately negative levels, subsequently becoming more positive
as the COVID-19 crisis reached a high point, and then becoming more
negative as the most urgent and severe stage of the public health crisis
passed. In addition to this general trend, however, we expect general differ-
ences among opposition parties to persist, with ideology, party size and
government experience playing a part in determining expressed sentiment.
We employ a comparative case study approach, selecting a diverse set
of established parliamentary democracies in terms of their political insti-
tutions and the crisis’ overall severity: Israel, Germany, the Netherlands
and the United Kingdom. We measure opposition party expressed senti-
ment towards the government using original manual content analysis of
parliamentary debates on COVID-19 related topics. A pooled analysis of
the data explores the explanatory power of crisis-related factors and
opposition party characteristics. The data show a monotonous trend
towards more negative sentiment over the course of the pandemic (up
until early July 2020) that provides some support to a rally-around-the-
flag dynamic. In line with previous research, we also find more positive
sentiment among larger opposition parties with more prior government
experience, while larger opposition parties without prior government
experience are more negative.
Opposition behaviour in times of crisis
Legislative conflict in parliamentary democracies is usually best under-
stood in terms of the distinction between opposition parties on the one
hand and government and governing parties on the other hand (King
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1976). Still, the relationship between government and opposition rarely is
purely conflictual: most opposition parties support at least some govern-
ment legislation or show other forms of cooperative behaviour towards
the government (Andeweg 2013).
In order to understand the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on oppos-
ition behaviour, it is helpful to consider the effects of crises on govern-
ment-opposition relations more generally. The most far-reaching option
is for the opposition to join the government, of which the Wartime gov-
ernments in the United Kingdom are prime examples (Fairlie 1918;
Jefferys 1991). As the COVID-19 crisis is perceived as a national emer-
gency, albeit of a different nature, the crisis has similarly been used as an
argument in government formation, especially in countries that did not
have a fully-fledged government at the moment of crisis onset. Beside
Israel, which we will discuss below, this occurred in Ireland, where
Fianna Fail and Fine Gael agreed to enter coalition talks for the first time
ever, citing COVID-19 as a propellant (Leahy and Kelly 2020). In other
cases, the opposition was invited to join the government’s efforts to deal
with the crisis from the outside. In Belgium, the incumbent minority
caretaker government reached a deal with opposition parties for support-
ing crisis measures, and in the Netherlands an opposition party member
and former junior health minister temporarily stepped in as Health minis-
ter when his predecessor resigned for health reasons.
Such agreements and appointments are rather exceptional, but we
expect the relationship between government and opposition to be affected
by the crisis in other parliamentary democracies as well. A public opinion
‘rally around the flag’ is a common pattern during major international
crises, such as the start of a war or large-scale terrorist attack. Such pat-
terns have been shown to arise in political systems as disparate as the
United States, Great Britain and Israel (Baum 2002; Brody and Shapiro
1989; Feinstein 2018; Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Lai and Reiter 2005;
Mueller 1970). During such an event, public support for governments
often, but certainly not always, increases (Mueller 1973). While the ‘rally
around the flag’ argument was developed in the context of public opinion,
Chowanietz (2011) shows that there is a similar pattern of elite rallying in
times of crisis: opposition parties’ criticism of the government markedly
declines after acts of terrorism.
Two explanations have been offered for such an increase in public or
elite support. The patriotism school argues that this stems from a feeling
of national unity, the idea that despite any differences that might exist, in
times of crisis we need to come together to support ‘our side’. Others
point at the importance of opinion leadership (Brody and Shapiro 1989),
noting that rallies do not occur in all crisis situations, but only when
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opposition opinion leaders refrain from openly criticising the president or
government. During a rapidly developing crisis, the information available
to governments is far superior to those of opposition leaders. Thus,
opposition leaders ‘have almost no incentive to criticise the president
when the news of the crisis first breaks’ (Brody and Shapiro 1989, 355).
Given such lack of dissent, public support is expected to increase.
The COVID-19 pandemic is a different type of event than those usu-
ally studied in the rally around the flag literature. Nevertheless, it shares
certain characteristics with a military crisis: it hit quite suddenly, with a
large effect on everyone’s daily life. Indeed, wartime analogies were often
used in political messages about this crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic dir-
ectly impacted on the way parliament could conduct its business, which is
likely to have further increased politicians’ perceptions of the pandemic
being an external threat (Jenny and M€uller 2020). Although the
‘adversary’ in the COVID-19 crisis is not as clearly defined as during a
military or terrorist attack, an understanding of the immediacy and scale
of the public health threat may cause a similar increase in public and
opposition support for the government’s actions.
In other respects, the COVID-19 public health crisis resembles eco-
nomic crises having a profound societal impact but lacking a clearly
defined ‘adversary’. In contrast to military crises, previous work shows
increased negative opposition behaviour during economic crises. The ana-
lysis of opposition behaviour during the economic crisis in southern
Europe in the late 2000s and early 2010s revealed a strong decrease in
parliamentary consensus, especially among non-mainstream opposition
parties (De Giorgi and Moury 2015; but see Marangoni and Verzichelli
2015). It is, however, important to bear the time frame in mind: the
financial-economic and Euro crisis unfolded over the period of almost a
decade. In most EU countries trust in government did not start declining
immediately; in some countries it even spiked in the first months after
the start of the financial crisis (Larsen et al. 2019; Roth et al. 2013, 23).
There is good reason to expect even stronger public support and elite
consensus in the early stages of a pandemic crisis: whereas economic cri-
ses or terrorist attacks relate to salient political conflict lines in most pol-
itical systems, which can be readily politicised, this cannot be said for the
public management of pandemics.
Thus, we expect that the effect of the COVID-19 crisis on opposition
party expressed sentiment followed the rally around the flag logic, at least
in the short term. COVID-19 was an immediate, severe, and rapidly
developing crisis that left the government with a huge information advan-
tage compared to opposition parties with regard to an issue that was not
politicised before. We, therefore, expect to observe increasingly positive
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opposition party sentiment towards the government as the COVID-19 cri-
sis reached its initial zenith. As the urgency and immediacy of the crisis
dissipated and the social and economic consequences of the crisis became
clearer, we expect that this positive sentiment gradually declined.
Explaining crisis relations: crisis-level and party-level
explanations
Our primary aim is to describe patterns in opposition expressed senti-
ment as the crisis developed. Given the current stage of the crisis and the
available theories, any analysis of the variation in these patterns is neces-
sarily exploratory. Nevertheless, several potential explanations can be
derived from existing work on government-opposition relations. In line
with the above argument, we will focus on the development of the crisis
over time. Additionally, we will analyse the heterogeneity of responses
among opposition parties.
We are aware of the impact of political system characteristics on oppos-
ition behaviour, which is more adversarial in majoritarian than in consen-
sus democracies (Norton 2008). In majoritarian democracies political
competition is closed and the main opposition party tries to replace the
government party (Mair 1996). In consensus democracies multi-party com-
petition generally offers at least some room for opposition parties to be
constructively engaged in policy making and the prospect of future cooper-
ation in government (Louwerse et al. 2017; Strøm 1990; Tuttnauer 2018).
In federal states, due to crisis management responsibilities often being
assigned to the federal and state levels, we would expect more cooperative
behaviour as some parties are in opposition on the federal but in govern-
ment on the state level (Hohendorf et al. 2021; Lijphart 2012). We will
therefore analyse the below patterns in a diverse set of countries in terms
of their political system. If we find that the within-country patterns hold in
this diverse set of countries, it is more likely that we can generalise these
findings to a broader set of parliamentary democracies.
Explanations relating to the crisis
A first set of factors that potentially impact on opposition party expressed
sentiment relate to characteristics of the crisis, particularly its severity and
its temporal development. The severity of the crisis varies between coun-
tries, even though comparing crisis impact is difficult, given differences in
reporting of cases and fatalities between countries. Analyses suggest that
in some countries the death toll in terms of excess death was relatively
low in the first six months of 2020, while it was considerable in others.
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Obviously, case fatalities also vary over time, and the crisis might be per-
ceived as more urgent when case and fatality numbers are on the rise in a
country or region. As a result, opposition parties could adjust their behav-
iour towards the government: more cooperative and positive at the
‘height’ of the crisis, more negative when the crisis threat is perceived to
be lower.
Rather than looking at crisis severity in terms of the number of cases
and fatalities, we can also think about the crisis in terms of its development
over time. After all, even in countries with limited case numbers and fatal-
ities, the impact of the COVID-19 crisis has been extensive (Hale et al.
2020). We expect opposition expressed sentiment to start at regular levels
before the virus spread substantially within a country and when threat per-
ception was still low. As the first wave of the COVID-19 crisis reached its
zenith, we would expect more positive opposition party expressed senti-
ment towards the government, also due to the large information asymme-
tries between government and opposition at this time. After this shock of
rapidly increasing cases and government lockdown measures started to dis-
sipate, we would expect to see more negative opposition sentiment as there
was more time to consider government actions and more information
about these choices became available to opposition parties. We thus expect
a curvilinear pattern of government-opposition relations over time.
A third way to capture crisis severity is via restrictive measures taken
by the government such as school closures and lockdowns (Hale et al.
2020). These measures likely contributed to and reflected the feeling of
urgency among the public and elites alike, even in countries with rela-
tively low case numbers and fatalities. This factor also taps into the gov-
ernment’s response to the crisis, with some observers arguing that taking
restrictive measures early on reflected proper government action, which
opposition parties would be more likely to support. Therefore, we expect
to see a correlation between the stringency of government measures and
opposition party expressed sentiment.
Party level-explanations
Studies of government-opposition relations in ‘normal’ times point to
characteristics of opposition parties as relevant explanatory variables:
some opposition parties take a more adversarial stance than others do.
This raises the question whether such party differences persevere during
the COVID-19 crisis. One could expect opposition party expressed senti-
ment to be uniformly positive in case of high-impact, short crises, such as
terrorist attacks (see, e.g. Chowanietz 2011). When crises last longer and
relate to existing lines of conflict, such as the Eurocrisis, the reverse can
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be observed: in Portugal, the Eurocrisis resulted in a stronger distinction
between ‘radical’ opposition parties who became more negative and
‘moderate’ parties who became more positive towards the government
(De Giorgi et al. 2015). We argued above that the COVID-19 crisis sits
somewhere in between. Therefore, our tentative expectation is that party
differences play a similar role in shaping opposition sentiment during
COVID-19 as during ‘normal’ times. Our analysis includes three variables
that have been demonstrated to explain variation in opposition behaviour.
First, larger ideological distance between a party and the government
reduces voting with the government (Hohendorf et al. 2021; Tuttnauer
2018). Even when politicisation might be low during a major public
health crisis, we expect that a larger ideological distance to the govern-
ment leads to more negative opposition expressed sentiment.
Second, opposition parties with more government experience are more
likely – above a certain size threshold – to support government legislation
(Tuttnauer 2018). In times of crisis, this ‘responsible’ (Mair 2009) behav-
iour might be even stronger than under normal circumstances (De Giorgi
and Moury 2015, 118).
Third, an opposition party may be less likely to support government
policy if it is large enough to achieve a position of power itself by replac-
ing the incumbent government after the next elections (Tuttnauer 2018).
Larger parties might show lower levels of support for government policies
and actions because their credibility as an electoral alternative suffers
from being overly supportive of the very government they seek to replace.
We expect the effects of experience and size to interact. While a small
party with no government experience might be a negligible or niche polit-
ical player, a large party with similarly no government experience is more
likely to play the role of the outsider, challenging the existing party ‘cartel’
of mainstream government alternatives. The latter kind is expected to
express more negative sentiments towards the government than the for-
mer. However, the difference between small and large parties may dis-
appear, or even take the reverse direction, when government experience is
considerable. In that case, it is the large party that might be especially
constrained by the norms and the expectations from ‘The Opposition’
(Norton 2008) to rally around the political mainstream in times of crisis,
and is thereby expected to express itself more positively.
Data and methods
Case selection
Our analysis covers parliamentary debates in four parliamentary democra-
cies: Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The
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selected countries provide theoretically crucial variation with regard to
two system-level variables: the type of democracy (consensus versus
majoritarian) and the vertical division of power (federal vs. centralised
states). Israel and the Netherlands are positioned towards the consensus
pole of Lijphart’s (2012) executive-parties dimension, Germany is also
positioned in the ‘consensus’ group, while the United Kingdom is clearly
majoritarian. German is a federal state, while Israel and the Netherlands
are unitary. In the United Kingdom’s asymmetrical federalist system,
health policy is a devolved issue, which implies that on this issue the ver-
tical organisation of the state plays a role.
The selected countries also vary in terms of the severity with which the
crisis hit. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands witnessed higher
numbers of fatalities than Germany and Israel in the first half of 2020.
According to The Economist Britain counted almost 65,000 excess deaths
since the country’s first 50 covid-19 related deaths until mid-July 2020
(The Economist 2020). This amounts to 98 excess deaths per 100,000 peo-
ple. The excess death figure for the Netherlands was 55, while for
Germany it was only 9 per 100,000 people. In Israel mortality levels in
May were only slightly higher than normal (Wu et al. 2020).
Measuring opposition party expressed sentiment towards
the government
Most studies of opposition behaviour in parliament focus on legislative
voting (De Giorgi and Marangoni 2015; Dewan and Spirling 2011; Hix
and Noury 2016; Hohendorf et al. 2020, 2021; Louwerse et al. 2017;
Tuttnauer 2018), amendments or opposition bills (Loxbo and Sj€olin
2017). The study of voting on bills, amendments and other proposals is,
however, not very well suited for our current purposes due to low num-
ber of legislative votes during the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis. For
example, between March 10 and May 12, 2020, the UK House of
Commons did not vote at all.
In contrast, all four parliaments debated the COVID-19 crisis on a
regular basis. Parliamentary speech has been used previously to map gov-
ernment-opposition relations using various methods of quantitative text
analysis (Curini et al. 2020; Lauderdale and Herzog 2016; Proksch et al.
2019). Curini et al. (2020) and Lauderdale and Herzog (2016) use
Wordfish and Wordshoal scaling of parliamentary debates respectively,
which is quite an indirect measure of government-opposition dynamics.
Proksch et al. (2019) directly measure the sentiment of government and
opposition parties using a dictionary-based sentiment analysis. Opposition
parties use a larger share of negative words than governing parties, which
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can be taken as an indicator for opposition behaviour vis-a-vis the gov-
ernment’s policies and actions. Our concern with the application of quan-
titative sentiment analysis during a crisis is that the perceived crisis threat
could lead to parliamentary actors choosing more negative words, espe-
cially when the pandemic is expanding. Any usage of positive words by
opposition parties towards government policy and action might thus be
offset by negative words regarding the severity of the crisis.
For these reasons, we use a manual content analysis of opposition
speeches. We focus on debates that deal with the direct response to the
public health crisis (e.g. dealing with lockdowns) or the general govern-
ment strategy for dealing with its fundamental effects (e.g. a major eco-
nomic recovery program or a supplementary budget). We include
plenary debates from the start of the pandemic until early July 2020 (see
Online appendix A for a full list). The number of days on which
COVID-19 related debates took place ranges from 6 to 31 in the
four countries.
Conceptually, we aim to capture the degree of manifest support or
criticism that an opposition party states towards specific government
action and government policy dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. We
coded speeches by opposition MPs1 on the level of paragraphs, which are
usually the units within a speech that develop a single argument. When a
paragraph consisted of clearly separate arguments that merit different
codes, we split it.
Each paragraph was coded on a five-point scale of opposition party
expressed sentiment, ranging from ‘very negative’ to ‘very positive’ (see
Online appendix B for full coding instructions). Coding proceeded in two
steps. First, the coder decided whether the paragraph was negative, neu-
tral, positive or whether it did not concern government action/policy (in
which case it was coded as ‘not applicable’). Neutral statements mostly
included questions about government policy or actions that did not con-
vey an opinion on behalf of the speaker. Second, the coder distinguished
qualitatively between ‘very’ and ‘moderately’ positive or negative state-
ments. Very negative statements are those that go beyond what is deemed
normal criticism of the government, for example using blunt, severe lan-
guage or personal criticism. Very positive statements include praise or
very strong credit for the government’s actions or policies, rather than
simply expressing support. These finer distinctions depend on what is
considered ‘normal’ behaviour in a specific parliament and are thus con-
text-dependent, which we argue is a characteristic of language use. As our
main inferences are drawn within countries, this does not pose a problem
for our analysis. Inter-coder reliability tests show satisfactory results with
Krippendorff’s alpha ranging from 0.77 to 0.87 (see Online appendix C).
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The codes for individual paragraphs were subsequently aggregated for all
speakers who spoke on behalf of their party2 on a specific day by taking
the mean value across all paragraphs.
An analysis of COVID-19 debates alone cannot show whether oppos-
ition parties expressed more positive or more negative sentiment in these
debates that they usually do. We can establish a ‘baseline’ for comparison
by analysing a major political debate in pre-COVID-19 times. We select
the most recent main ‘general’ political debate before the onset of the
pandemic in the United Kingdom (Debate on the Address, December
2019), the Netherlands (Algemene Beschouwingen, September 2019) and
Germany (General Debate on the Chancellor’s Budget, September 2019).
For Israel, such an analysis is impossible, because elections were held in
early March 2020, which means that there is no pre-COVID-19 debate
under the same parliament and government as the debates during the
COVID-19 crisis. These debates are coded using the same opposition
expressed sentiment scale.
Operationalisation of the independent variables
The crisis-related variables include the number of newly reported cases
and fatalities (per 1 million inhabitants), obtained from Johns Hopkins
University’s COVID-19 Data Repository (Dong et al. 2020). While con-
firmed cases and fatalities are underreported in most countries, this is the
information about the severity of the crisis that was available to legislators
at the time. We study the temporal development by including the (ortho-
gonalized) debate date and its squared term as explanatory variables. We
rely on the Oxford Government Response Tracker to measure the policy
stringency of the government measures (Hale et al. 2020). The Stringency
Index ranges from 0 (no measures) to 100 (full restrictions on all
included sub-items).
Our analysis includes three party-level variables. The left-right distance
between an opposition party and the government is calculated from the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) 2019 (Bakker et al. 2020). We calculate
the government’s position as the seat-share weighted average position of
the coalition parties and calculate the absolute distance to this position
for each opposition party. For Israel, which is not included in the CHES,
we rely on a separate expert survey that we administered in July 2020,
including the same general left-right question as the CHES. Government
experience is measured as the number of years the party has been in gov-
ernment since 1990. Party size is measured as the party’s seat share in
parliament. Government experience and party size are calculated using
the ParlGov database (D€oring and Manow 2018).
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Methods of data analysis
Our data analysis includes a descriptive analysis of opposition expressed
sentiment as well as pooled regression models to capture the impact of
the crisis- and party-level explanatory variables. For the latter we apply
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with country fixed effects and clustered
standard errors by party. We are careful not to read too much into the
country differences in our analysis, as the differences found might be due
to differences in debate selection or coding decisions between countries.
As a robustness test, we applied a multilevel linear regression model that
uses the individual speech acts as the unit of analysis; this model corrobo-
rates the findings presented here (see Online appendix E).
Results
Opposition expressed sentiment towards the government became increas-
ingly negative in each of the four countries as the COVID-19 crisis devel-
oped. Figure 1 presents the mean expressed sentiment on each day. The
decreasing pattern is most clear for Germany, while for other countries
there is more variation around an otherwise clearly negative trend. The
estimates for the United Kingdom and Israel include a number of days
with relatively short debates, which explains the larger variation.
Mean opposition party expressed sentiment is clearly more positive












































Figure 1. Mean opposition expressed sentiment towards the government in COVID-
19 debates.
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pre-COVID-19 baselines of 0.90 in the UK, 0.82 for Germany and
0.74 for the Netherlands. Opposition expressed sentiment in the later
COVID-19 debates is generally much closer to those baseline levels. With
the partial exception of Germany, there is little evidence of a curvilinear
trend. Opposition expressed sentiment starts at relatively positive levels
and does not clearly ‘peak’ at the height of the crisis (mid/late-March to
mid/late-April), but rather declines in a monotonous fashion.
However, these aggregate patterns hide relevant variation among
opposition parties in each country. Therefore, we will briefly describe and
discuss the patterns in each country, before turning to the pooled regres-
sion analysis.
Germany
Figure 2 shows the position that the four German opposition parties took
towards government actions and policies in all general COVID-19 related
policy debates in the German Bundestag and two debates on supplemen-
tary budgets to remedy the direct financial implications of the crisis. The
graph reveals consistent party differences. Overall, the Greens displayed
the most positive sentiment vis-a-vis the government (e.g. on March 3:
‘From our perspective, the government is currently doing many things
right’), whereas the right-wing populist AfD was most negative according

































Figure 2. Opposition expressed sentiment towards the government in COVID-19
debates – Germany.
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this country and give the freedom back to the people!’). The scores for the
Left Party and the liberal FDP are somewhat in the middle, especially when
we account for the fact that the positive outlier for the Left on February 12
is based on only two coded paragraphs. This ordering of parties is in line
with the competitive behaviour of the various opposition parties in recent
years (Hohendorf et al. 2020; Stecker 2018). With 15 years in opposition
and strong performance in current polls, the Greens are eager to get back
into power and are very accommodating towards the government. By con-
trast, the AfD is clearly a pariah party and pursues a strictly confrontational
strategy in the Bundestag. The Liberals and the Left oscillate between com-
petition and cooperation with potential future coalition partners, also due
to intra-party disputes about future strategy.
In Germany, we do observe the theoretically expected curvilinear tem-
poral dynamics. All opposition parties acted more positively towards the
government when the situation was deteriorating rapidly on March 25.
On that day, all parties except the AfD emphasised the constructive col-
laboration between government and opposition using typical ‘rally around
the flag’ rhetoric. For example, Christian Lindner (FDP) stated that ‘In
times like this, government and opposition have a joint responsibility for
the state’. Ralph Brinkhaus of the governing party CDU in turn thanked
the opposition for lifting procedural deadlines and ‘saying now it is more
important that we get solutions for this country’. We also see relatively
positive sentiment when the crisis was becoming more threatening on
March 4 and when improvements had just begun and were quite uncer-
tain on April 23.
One core reason for these highly cooperative opposition party senti-
ments is federalism. In Germany, many jurisdictions relevant for dealing
with the COVID-19 pandemic lie at the state level (e.g. on many public
health and general lockdown measures) so that the federal government
had to coordinate its crisis reaction with the state governments (Hegele
and Schnabel 2021). As Greens, FDP and Left are all members of some
state governments, all parties except the AfD were part of an informal
coordination regime that decided (implicitly) by unanimity and thus were
de facto veto players for many important crisis measures. This joint
responsibility put limits on the degree to which most opposition parties
could credibly blame the federal government for its immediate crisis reac-
tion. A second reason may be the common perception in the public that
the governments on both the national and subnational level handled the
situation well leading to low numbers of cases and casualties compared to
the situation in other countries.
By the end of May, when the acute crises had subsided and the imme-
diate need for coordination had decreased, opposition parties reverted to
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more negative sentiment. While the Greens still openly agreed with some
government measures, all opposition parties increasingly voiced criticism,
especially with regard to the planned economic recovery measures.
Israel
When the COVID-19 crisis hit its shores, Israel was already experiencing
a dramatic political crisis. The first patient in Israel was positively diag-
nosed for COVID-19 on February 21 (Maor et al. 2020). Less than two
weeks later, elections were held for the third time in a year, after repeated
stalemates between the parties supporting the incumbent prime minister
Netanyahu and those opposing him. By the time the new parliament con-
vened, the caretaker government had already shut down the education
system and non-essential businesses, and COVID-related debates revolved
mainly around economic measures and the government’s employment of
the secret service to track infection spread.
With the stalemate between the pro- and anti-Netanyahu blocs still in
place, even the question of which parties constitute the opposition was up
in the air. Initially, it was the leader of the anti-Netanyahu bloc, Blue-
White (BW) leader Benny Gantz, who received the role of formateur.
However, on March 26, Gantz decided to join Netanyahu in an
‘emergency’ grand coalition, citing the pandemic as one of several rea-
sons. This decision shattered the party system, resulting in both BW and
the left Labour-Gesher-Meretz merger to split, with some factions joining
the grand coalition and others, as well as Netanyahu’s long-time right-
wing partner, Yemina, staying in opposition.
Figure 3 shows the positions taken by the four parties that were in
opposition throughout the whole period. The four parties are similar in
that none has been overwhelmingly positive towards the government,
even early on. The first two months of the crisis were characterised by
erratic responses of all four parties, registering a positive score on at least
one occasion. Consequently, all parties became more consistently negative,
with no such overall positive position from May onwards.
Surprisingly, the most supportive party was initially the Joint List (JL),
a mostly-Arab party and the one closest to a pariah party in Israel. Its
leaders repeatedly used the plenum to express solidarity in the face of the
pandemic and to reach out to their voters urging them to abide by
the Ministry of Health’s orders (e.g. Ahmad Tibi, April 1). In line with
the pragmatism and policy-driven focus characterising the Israeli oppos-
ition in general (Tuttnauer 2020), the Joint List readily supported (as did
other opposition parties) relevant legislation as the crisis unfolded. This
support was sometimes crucial to the legislation’s success. Eager to taunt
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their right-wing foes and perhaps in a push towards the mainstream, JL
repeatedly claimed credit for that support. At the same time, Joint List
leaders vehemently attacked the government, e.g. claiming ‘they will lie to
your face’ and calling for public demonstrations (Ayman Odeh, April 6).
For the right-wing Israel Our Home (IOH) and the left-wing Meretz,
positive attitudes early on can be explained by the unique situation pre-
ceding the grand coalition’s investiture, in which these parties held
important parliamentary committee roles. For example, Oded Forer’s
(IOH) comment that ‘[we] will not be the brake to stop the government
[from fulfilling their plans] on necessary issues regarding the Corona’
(April 6) was made from a position of power, holding the role of Finance
Committee Chair. The two parties differ, however, in their proclivity for
extreme negativity. While Meretz was much farther ideologically from
both governments than IOH, it mostly voiced moderate negativity aimed
at the bills and measures. In contrast, IOH was much quicker to voice
extremely negative views, in accordance with their tendency for populist
rhetoric, as when Eli Avidar called Netanyahu a ‘dictator’, said ‘this gov-
ernment has no desire to solve the Corona problem’ and called for mass
demonstrations (June 22).
The only party remaining steadily negative throughout the period was
Yesh Atid (YA), the largest opposition party for which resistance to
Netanyahu and their once-allies BW was visceral and more personal than

































Figure 3. Opposition expressed sentiment towards the government in COVID-19
debates – Israel.
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government’s reliance on the secret service to track infections, and more,
YA’s fiercest criticism was directed towards the grand coalition’s forma-
tion itself: ‘People have nothing to eat, businesses are collapsing, in hospi-
tals people are dying… In these circumstances, forming a bloated
corruption government is a national disaster.’ (Yair Lapid, April 16).
The Netherlands
Dutch opposition parties’ expressed sentiment towards the government’s
policies and actions shows clear variety between parties and over time
(see Figure 4). Some opposition parties were quite critical towards the
government throughout the period of analysis, most clearly the Freedom
Party (PVV) and to a somewhat lesser degree the Socialist Party (SP).
These parties are ideologically far removed from the government. Other
parties were more positively inclined from the start and mostly remained
that way, particularly the small orthodox protestant SGP and the 50PLUS
party. Despite its perennial opposition status, the SGP has had a
‘governmental’ attitude for a long time. 50PLUS was very concerned
about the impact of the crisis on the elderly and addressed this concern
constructively in the debates.
A move from more positive to more negative stances is visible for
most of the other parties, most clearly so for GreenLeft (GroenLinks).
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Figure 4. Opposition expressed sentiment towards the government in COVID-19
debates – The Netherlands.
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way in which the government attempts to face up to the crisis’) which
gradually transformed in more a negative appreciation of the govern-
ment’s policies and actions (‘This is a useless arrangement.’). This nega-
tive trend is also visible – to a slightly lesser degree – for Labour (PvdA)
and DENK. The Party for the Animals (PvdD) was initially quite negative,
partly related to the source of the new virus, which they link to the way
in which animals are kept, subsequently more positive during the height
of the crisis and again more negative afterwards. Forum for Democracy
(FvD), a small right-wing populist party, alternated between being critical
of a lack of lockdown measures (mid-March) to a more positive stance
when such measures were taken, gradually moving towards more negative
positions in May and June.
Perhaps surprisingly, none of the Dutch parties score very positively
on our opposition expressed sentiment scale, not even at the zenith of the
crisis. This can be partially attributed to ideologically distant parties with-
out government experience, such as PVV, SP and FvD, all of which can
be – to a varying degree – regarded as populist parties (Meijers and
Zaslove 2021, 22); these parties displayed particularly negative sentiment.
An additional explanation is that support for the government’s policies
was oftentimes implicit: most opposition parties did not spend many
words supporting or praising the government, but they also did not
oppose government policy. This is not uncommon, particularly on issues
that are not highly divisive or politically salient.
Contrary to the German case, Dutch opposition parties were not dir-
ectly involved in COVID-19 policy making either. The government made
the decisions based on advice from experts; opposition parties were not
directly involved in the policy-making process. In the parliamentary
debates government ministers showed a willingness to take into account
opposition parties’ concerns, but this was after policy was initially set by
the government. In that sense the old Dutch political ‘rule of the game’
that the government has the right to govern with little influence from
parliament was certainly revived in this case (Lijphart 1968).
United Kingdom
‘I appreciate the cross-party approach that is being taken to this outbreak
as reflected in the shadow Minister’s remarks’, commented Secretary of
State for Health, Matt Hancock (Conservative) in the very first debate on
COVID in the House of Commons, on January 23, 2020. The consensual
tone of that debate, especially by British standards, is striking as it was
more than a week before the first two confirmed cases in the UK, with
speakers expressing hope that the virus would not reach it.
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This less adversarial style cannot be explained by the policy area con-
cerned: the National Health Service (NHS) is frequently the topic of fierce
disagreement in British politics. Now, such disagreement was referred to
only obliquely. On February 3, Jonathan Ashworth (Labour), the Shadow
Secretary of State for Health, commented, for example, that ‘This is a
time of considerable strain on the NHS. I know the Secretary of State and
I disagree on why this is, but he will accept that it is a time of high pres-
sure.’ (italics added).
Figure 5 shows the average scores for each of the parties over time. The
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has been most supportive of the govern-
ment throughout this period: ‘I congratulate the Secretary of State on his
clear leadership on this matter and his determination to deal with the
issues’ (Jim Shannon, DUP spokesperson for health, February 26). The
DUP is ideologically closest to the governing Conservative party. The two
largest opposition parties, Labour and the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP)
showed very similar patterns of opposition expressed sentiment, although
the content of their interventions differed: SNP spokespersons would often
express the need for all countries within the UK to coordinate their
responses (health policy is devolved to the Scottish, Welsh, and Northern
Ireland governments), while Labour spokespersons would often criticise the
government’s ‘neglect’ of the crisis’ impact on the poor and on minorities.
That the smaller opposition parties seem to have taken a more negative
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Figure 5. Opposition expressed sentiment towards the government in COVID-19
debates – United Kingdom.
18 T. LOUWERSE ET AL.
constraints and usually speaking later in debates. This may have
prompted these parties to prioritise their questions and criticisms rather
than repeat statements of support for the government’s measures made by
previous speakers.
The gradual erosion of cross-party support for the government’s
approach to the crisis is – more or less clearly – visible for all opposition
parties. One might have expected an impact of the leadership change in
the Labour party in early April, but Keir Starmer’s promise of a more
constructive opposition generally does not seem to have delayed his
party’s stepwise return to more adversarial behaviour with regard to
COVID policy. It is important to note that this shift among opposition
parties did not wait until the heat of the crisis was over. This may be
related to the fact that while most of the early debates dealt with the pub-
lic health response to COVID, gradually other policy domains became
involved as well, such as the package to support businesses and prevent
mass unemployment, and the disproportional impact of the pandemic on
the BAME (Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic) community. On such
issues, ideological distinctions may have prompted more negative rhetoric
even early into the crisis: ‘I am afraid that it is quite evident that the
Government have lost support and confidence across the Chamber, and
that is echoed by the markets.’ (Matt Western, Labour Opposition Whip,
March 19).
The government’s crisis management also provided occasion for oppos-
ition parties to take a more negative stance: for example, prime minister
Johnson’s May 10 announcement of an easing of lockdown, without first
consulting the leaders of the devolved governments or alleged breaches of
lockdown rules by the prime minister’s chief adviser, Dominic
Cummings, in April (see also Fancourt et al. 2020).
Pooled regression analysis
The results of our pooled analysis are presented in Table 1. We first esti-
mate a baseline model consisting of only the date and its squared value
(orthogonalized and transformed so the date variable ranges between 0
and 1) along with country fixed-effects. This model confirms that the
effect of passage of time was monotonously negative, and not curvilinear,
since the date-squared coefficient is insignificant.
Model 2 replaces the date variables with our crisis-level variables. We
observe no significant relation between case numbers, deaths and oppos-
ition expressed sentiment. Contrary to our expectation, the relationship
between the stringency index and opposition sentiment is negative. This
can be explained by the fact that stringency was low in early March, but
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expressed sentiment was relatively positive, while later on in the crisis
stringency was high, and opposition expressed sentiment negative. The
overall fit of model 2 is worse than that of model 1, suggesting that
opposition expressed sentiment is not just a response to objective criteria
of crisis severity, but that timing matters. Opposition parties were willing
to ‘cut the government some slack’ early on, when the crisis first hit – in
line with the observations from our country analyses.
In models 3 and 4 we separately assess the effects of ideological dis-
tance and the interaction between party size and office experience.
Ideological distance has the expected effect – the farther away from the
government, the more negative an opposition party’s sentiment is – but
the effect diminishes when other party features are included.3 Party size
and office experience have the expected interactive effect. Given no office
Table 1. Pooled regression analysis of opposition party expressed sentiment.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Baseline Crisis indicators Ideology Gov. Exp.  Size Full model
Date –0.223 –0.236 –0.245 –0.245
(0.030) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048)
Date^2 –0.014 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.028) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037)
Daily cases/1mil 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Daily deaths/1mil –0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Policy stringency –0.006 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ideological distance –0.057 –0.034
(0.027) (0.028)
Office experience –0.017 –0.017
(0.013) (0.013)
Party size –0.039 –0.034
(0.012) (0.013)




Germany 0.166 0.124 0.158 0.321 0.291†
(0.179) (0.182) (0.167) (0.141) (0.147)
United Kingdom 0.311 0.263† 0.328 0.273 0.269
(0.120) (0.142) (0.118) (0.121) (0.111)
Israel 0.048 –0.017 0.019 0.192 0.167
(0.120) (0.121) (0.126) (0.089) (0.107)
Constant –0.605 –0.296† –0.493 –0.472 –0.389†
(0.098) (0.146) (0.196) (0.178) (0.194)
Observations 328 328 328 328 328
R-squared 0.231 0.124 0.255 0.286 0.292
Note: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis with clustered standard errors (by party) in paren-
theses. p< 0.01, p< 0.05, †p< 0.1.
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experience, larger parties express more negative positions then smaller
ones, but this effect is mitigated as office experience increases.4 Figure 6
plots the interaction effect based on our full Model 5. It shows that the
effect of party size is negative for parties with up to 8 years of office
experience in the last 30 years, which accounts for 76% of the parties in
our data (19 of 25). The effect of office experience is positive for parties
obtaining more than 11.2% of all seats in the chamber, which accounts
for 28% of the parties (7 of 25). Therefore, for most parties, larger size
leads to more negativity, and for most parties, office experience does not
significantly affect position. Only the largest parties are positively affected
in their position-taking by their government experience, and only the
most experienced opposition parties are unaffected by size.5
Discussion and conclusion
Our analysis shows that opposition party expressed sentiment in parlia-
mentary debates on COVID-19 started out relatively positive towards the
government’s actions and policies and increasingly became more negative.
Many opposition politicians cited the need for cooperation across the aisle
when countries were faced with an exceptional public health crisis. Our
findings are in line with those observed in military crises and possibly
Figure 6. The effect of party size and office experience on opposition
expressed sentiment.
Note: Marginal effects with 95 percent confidence intervals based on Model 5. Bars denote the distri-
bution of the variable on the x-axis.
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also the longer-term dynamics in economic crises. In the short term, one
can observe a ‘rally effect’, while in the longer term the negative conse-
quences of the crisis result in more negative opposition party expressed
sentiment. The finding of more positive opposition expressed sentiment
early on in the crisis is also in line with a ‘rally around the flag’ effect in
public opinion that was observed, to a varying extent, in many countries
(Kritzinger et al. 2021; YouGov 2020).
Contrary to our expectations, we do not observe a curvilinear pattern
of opposition party expressed sentiment – first an increase, then a
decrease in positive sentiment – but rather a monotonous decline. One
potential explanation is that public health crisis management was not a
politicised issue before the start of the pandemic and therefore did not
lead to adversarial debate. Government and opposition parties mostly fol-
lowed expert advice. When it became clear the COVID-19 crisis would
not be over in a matter of weeks or even months, opinions on policy
actions started to diverge more. Moreover, the crisis broadened from a
public health situation to a social and economic crisis, which are trad-
itionally more politicised issues. Another explanation might be that gov-
ernments reached out to the opposition early on during the crisis, which
resulted in positive expressed sentiment from opposition politicians.
Interestingly, our analysis of parliamentary debates shows that this was
particularly the case in the United Kingdom as well as in Germany; in the
latter case the need for federal coordination is an important factor. In
contrast, in the Dutch case we see few opposition spokespersons refer to
opposition inclusion in COVID-19 policy making, at least not beyond
what is considered normal. In Israel, the situation was complicated by the
fact that government formation took place at that time, which somewhat
blurred the lines between government and opposition. In future work on
government-opposition relations during a crisis, the government’s attitude
to cooperation with the opposition could be explored more fully.
While we observe more positive opposition expressed sentiment early
on in the COVID-19 crisis, we find little indication that government-
opposition relations have changed qualitatively due to the crisis. Party-
specific factors play out as indicated by previous research (Tuttnauer
2018). All opposition parties were more positive towards the government
early on in the crisis, but relative differences between parties remained.
One reason might be that parliamentary actors interpret and address the
crisis and its consequences within established competitive strategies.
Where critical questions were asked of the government, these largely ori-
ginated from parties’ existing priorities: for example, social-democratic
parties highlighted social and ethnic inequality, the SNP emphasised
regional autonomy and the Green parties stressed the importance of
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ecological reform in the design of economic recovery programs addressing
the crisis.
Our analysis focuses on established parliamentary democracies during
the first months of the COVID-19 crisis. Government and opposition
responses in countries that risk democratic backsliding are not necessarily
comparable to the patterns we find here (see Bolleyer and Salat 2021).
Moreover, many countries have been dealing with a ‘second wave’ of
COVID-19 in the autumn of 2020. We cannot predict how this will affect
government-opposition relations. Tentatively, we should not necessarily
expect a return to more positive opposition expressed sentiment. The cri-
sis is no longer ‘new’, governments have had more time to prepare and
some issues around the handling of the pandemic now seem to speak
more to longstanding ideological differences than was the case in early
2020. This expectation needs to be tested empirically in future work.
Notes
1. Our analysis excludes individual MPs who had left their party and parties
with a single MP, which could not be positioned reliably.
2. In the United Kingdom, we focus on shadow cabinet members and party
spokespersons. In Israel, we focussed on party leaders or, in their absence,
the highest-ranked party representative. In the Netherlands and Germany all
speakers are considered to speak on behalf of their party.
3. The three party-level variables are not highly correlated. The strongest
correlation, even without accounting for party clusters, is r ¼ .48 between
ideological distance and party size.
4. Including the populism scale from the Global Party Survey (Norris 2019) as
an additional explanatory variable does not add any explanatory power to the
model (populism is not highly correlated with any of the party-level variables
or the interaction term). Furthermore, adding a dummy variable identifying
all populist parties does not change the direction of the party-level
coefficients (see Online Appendix E).
5. These two groups barely overlap: only two parties in our data are both larger
than 11.2% of seats and have more than 8 years of office experience – Labour
(United Kingdom) and the FDP (Germany).
Acknowledgements
We thank the reviewers and editors for their constructive criticisms and sugges-
tions regarding an earlier version of this paper. We thank Eyal Ben-Shimol,
Denny van der Vlist and Jonas Wenzig for their research assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 23
Funding
Tom Louwerse acknowledges the financial support of the Dutch Research
Council/Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO)
under Grant VI.Vidi.195.020.
Notes on contributors
Tom Louwerse is Associate Professor of Political Science, Institute of Political
Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands. His research focuses on legislative
politics, political representation and elections, and has appeared in journals such
as Party Politics, Political Studies, and Political Science Research and Methods. [t.p.
louwerse@fsw.leidenuniv.nl]
Ulrich Sieberer is Professor of Empirical Political Science at the University of
Bamberg. His main research interests are political institutions, institutional
design, legislative behaviour and coalition politics. His work has recently been
published in journals such as the British Journal of Political Science, Political
Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Party
Politics and West European Politics. [ulrich.sieberer@uni-bamberg.de]
Or Tuttnauer is Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at the Mannheim Centre for
European Social Research, University of Mannheim. His research interests include
legislative politics, political parties and comparative political institutions. His
work has been published in journals such as The Journal of Politics, European
Union Politics, and Party Politics. [or.tuttnauer@mzes.uni-mannheim.de]
Rudy B. Andeweg is Emeritus Professor of Political Science at Leiden University.
He has published on political legitimacy, political representation, legislative stud-
ies and coalition government. He recently co-edited The Oxford Handbook of





Rudy B. Andeweg http://orcid.org/0000-0003-4451-441X
Data availability statement
The replication data and script are available from https://doi.org/10.6084/
m9.figshare.12793808.v1
References
Andeweg, Rudy B. (2013). ‘Parties in Parliament: The Blurring of Opposition’, in
Wolfgang C. M€uller and Hanne Marthe Narud (eds.), Party Governance and
Party Democracy. New York, NY: Springer, 99–114.
24 T. LOUWERSE ET AL.
Bakker, Ryan, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny,
Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova (2020). 2019 Chapel Hill
Expert Survey (Version 2019.1). Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill.
Baum, Matthew A. (2002). ‘The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-
Flag Phenomenon’, International Studies Quarterly, 46:2, 263–98.
Bolleyer, Nicole, and Orsolya Salat (2021). ‘Executive Aggrandizement and
Parliamentary Involvement in Times of Crisis: COVID-19 Populism and the
Self-Reinforcement of Executive Power’, West European Politics.
Brody, Richard A., and Catherine R. Shapiro (1989). ‘Policy Failure and Public
Support: The Iran-Contra Affair and Public Assessment of President Reagan’,
Political Behavior, 11:4, 353–69.
Chowanietz, Christophe (2011). ‘Rallying around the Flag or Railing against the
Government? Political Parties’ Reactions to Terrorist Acts’, Party Politics, 17:5,
673–98.
Curini, Luigi, Airo Hino, and Atsushi Osaka (2020). ‘The Intensity of
Government-Opposition Divide as Measured through Legislative Speeches and
What We Can Learn from It: Analyses of Japanese Parliamentary Debates,
1953-2013’, Government and Opposition, 55:2, 184–201.
De Giorgi, Elisabetta, and Francesco Marangoni (2015). ‘Government Laws and
the Opposition Parties’ Behaviour in Parliament’, Acta Politica, 50:1, 64–81.
De Giorgi, Elisabetta, and Catherine Moury (2015). ‘Conclusions: Great
Recession, Great Cooperation?’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 21:1, 115–20.
De Giorgi, Elisabetta, Catherine Moury, and Jo~ao Pedro Ruivo (2015).
‘Incumbents, Opposition and International Lenders: Governing Portugal in
Times of Crisis’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 21:1, 54–74.
Dewan, Torun, and Arthur Spirling (2011). ‘Strategic Opposition and
Government Cohesion in Westminster Democracies’, American Political Science
Review, 105:2, 337–58.
Dong, Ensheng, Hongru Du, and Lauren Gardner (2020). ‘An Interactive Web-
Based Dashboard to Track COVID-19 in Real Time’, The Lancet Infectious
Diseases, 20:5, 533–4.
D€oring, Holger, and Philip Manow (2018). Parliaments and Governments
Database (ParlGov): Information on Parties, Elections and Cabinets in Modern
Democracies, available at http://www.parlgov.org/ (accessed 1 August 2020).
Fairlie, John A. (1918). ‘British War Cabinets’, Michigan Law Review, 16:7, 471.
Fancourt, Daisy, Andrew Steptoe, and Liam Wright (2020). ‘The Cummings
Effect: Politics, Trust, and Behaviours During the COVID-19 Pandemic’, The
Lancet, 396:10249, 464–65.
Feinstein, Yuval (2018). ‘One Flag, Two Rallies: Mechanisms of Public Opinion in
Israel during the 2014 Gaza War’, Social Science Research, 69, 65–82.
Hale, Thomas, Webster Sam, Petherick Anna, Phillips Toby, and Kira Beatriz
(2020). ‘Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker’. Blavatnik School
of Government, available at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-proj-
ects/coronavirus-government-response-tracker (accessed 7 July 2020).
Hegele, Yvonne, and Johanna Schnabel (2021). ‘Federalism and the Management
of the COVID-19 Crisis: Centralisation, Decentralisation, and (Non-
Coordination)’, West European Politics. doi:10.1080/01402382.2021.1873529
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 25
Hetherington, Marc J., and Michael Nelson (2003). ‘Anatomy of a Rally Effect:
George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism’, Political Science and Politics, 36:1,
37–42.
Hix, Simon, and Abdul Noury (2016). ‘Government-Opposition or Left-Right?
The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures’, Political Science
Research and Methods, 4:2, 249–73.
Hohendorf, Lukas, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2020). “Oppositional
Strategies Between Cooperation and Conflict: An Analysis of Opposition Party
Voting in the German Bundestag, 1949–2013”, in Sebastian Bukow and Uwe
Jun (eds.), Continuity and Change of Party Democracies in Europe: PVS
Sonderheft. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 309–42.
Hohendorf, Lukas, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2021). ‘Veto Power
Fosters Cooperative Behaviour: Institutional Incentives and Government-
Opposition Voting in the German Bundestag’, West European Politics, 44:4,
921–45.
Jefferys, Kevin (1991). The Churchill Coalition and Wartime Politics 1940-1945.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Jenny, Marcelo, and Wolfgang C. M€uller (2020). “Parlamentarische Opposition in
Der Corona-Krise.” Austrian Corona Panel Project - Corona-Blog, available at
https://viecer.univie.ac.at/corona-blog/corona-blog-beitraege/blog38/ (accessed 1
August 2020).
King, Anthony (1976). ‘Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations’, Legislative
Studies Quarterly, 1:1, 11–36.
Kritzinger, Sylvia, Martial Foucault, Romain Lachat, Julia Partheym€uller and
Carolina Plescia (2021). ‘Rally around the Flag: The COVID-19 Crisis and
Trust in the National Government’, West European Politics.
Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter (2005). ‘Rally ’Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion
and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-2001’, International Studies
Quarterly, 49:2, 255–72.
Larsen, Erik Gahner, Robert Klemmensen, and Michael Baggesen Klitgaard
(2019). ‘Bailout or Bust? Government Evaluations in the Wake of a Bailout’,
European Political Science Review, 11:2, 231–46.
Lauderdale, Benjamin E., and Alexander Herzog (2016). ‘Measuring Political
Positions from Legislative Speech’, Political Analysis, 24:3, 374–94.
Leahy, Pat, and Fiach Kelly (2020). ‘FG and FF to Start Government Formation
Talks Propelled by Covid-19’, The Irish Times, March 11.
Lijphart, Arend (1968). The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy
in The Netherlands. Berkely: University of California Press.
Lijphart, Arend (2012). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Louwerse, Tom, Simon Otjes, David M. Willumsen, and Patrik €Ohberg. (2017).
‘Reaching across the Aisle: Explaining Government–Opposition Voting in
Parliament’, Party Politics, 23:6, 746–59.
Loxbo, Karl, and Mats Sj€olin. (2017). ‘Parliamentary Opposition on the Wane?
The Case of Sweden, 1970–2014’, Government and Opposition, 52:4, 587–613.
Mair, Peter (1996). “Party Systems and Structures of Competition”, in Lawrence
Leduc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris (eds.), Comparing Democracies:
Elections and Voting in Global Perspective. London: SAGE, 83–106.
26 T. LOUWERSE ET AL.
Mair, Peter (2009). “Representative versus Responsible Government”, in
Ingrid Van Biezen (ed.), On Parties, Party Systems and Democracy. Selected
Writings of Peter Mair. Colchester: ECPR Press, 581–96.
Maor, Moshe, Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan, and David Chinitz (2020). ‘When
COVID-19, Constitutional Crisis, and Political Deadlock Meet: The Israeli Case
from a Disproportionate Policy Perspective’, Policy and Society, 39:3, 442–57.
Marangoni, Francesco, and Luca Verzichelli. (2015). ‘From a Technocratic
Solution to a Fragile Grand Coalition: The Impact of the Economic Crisis on
Parliamentary Government in Italy’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 21:1,
35–53.
Meijers, Maurits J., and Andrej Zaslove (2021). ‘Measuring Populism in Political
Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach’, Comparative Political Studies, 54:2,
372–407.
Mueller, John E. (1970). ‘Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson’,
American Political Science Review, 64:1, 18–34.
Mueller, John E. (1973). War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: Wiley.
Norris, Pippa (2019). “The Global Party Survey”, available at https://www.global-
partysurvey.org/ (accessed 1 August 2020).
Norton, Philip (2008). ‘Making Sense of Opposition’, The Journal of Legislative
Studies, 14:1–2, 236–50.
Proksch, Sven-Oliver, Will Lowe, Jens W€ackerle, and Stuart Soroka (2019).
‘Multilingual Sentiment Analysis: A New Approach to Measuring Conflict in
Legislative Speeches’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 44:1, 97–131.
Roth, Felix, Felicitas D. Nowak-Lehmann, and Thomas Otter (2013). ‘Crisis and
Trust in National and European Union Institutions—Panel Evidence for the
EU, 1999 to 2012’, Working paper, EUI RSCAS 2013/31, available at http://hdl.
handle.net/1814/26975 (accessed 1 August 2020).
Stecker, Christian (2018). ‘Germany: Heated Debates but Cooperative Behaviour’,
in Elisabetta De Giorgi and Gabriella Ilonszki (eds.), Opposition Parties in
European Legislatures: Conflict or Consensus? London: Routledge, 35–52.
Strøm, Kaare (1990). Minority Government and Majority Rule: Studies in
Rationality and Social Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
The Economist (2020). “Tracking Covid-19 Excess Deaths across Countries.” The
Economist, available at https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/07/15/
tracking-covid-19-excess-deaths-across-countries (accessed 1 August 2020).
Tuttnauer, Or (2018). ‘If You Can Beat Them, Confront Them: Party-Level
Analysis of Opposition Behavior in European National Parliaments’, European
Union Politics, 19:2, 278–98.
Tuttnauer, Or (2020). ‘Government–Opposition Relations in a Fragmented,
Personalized, and Multidimensional Setting: The Case of Israel’, Party Politics,
26:2, 203–14. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068818761198.
Wu, Jin, McCann Allison, Katz Josh, and Peltier Elian (2020). “187,000 Missing
Deaths: Tracking the True Toll of the Coronavirus Outbreak.” The New York
Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/04/21/world/cor-
onavirus-missing-deaths.html (accessed 1 August 2020).
YouGov. (2020). “COVID-19: Level of Support for Actions Governments Could
Take.” YouGov (blog), available at https://today.yougov.com/topics/inter-
national/articles-reports/2020/03/17/level-support-actions-governments-could-
take (accessed 1 August 2020).
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS 27
